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something special about human social relations: cooperative,
reciprocal, coalitional, ﬂuid, tribal, vindictive, and acutely
reputation based.
Add to this that we are able to pool our skills and knowl-
edge and to trade and exchange goods and services. This
means we can beneﬁt from the collective wisdom of our so-
cieties and we have a history; our communities and socie-
ties accumulate ideas, knowledge, and technology. These lat-
ter features of human society have meant that, more than any
other species, our groups are vital to our life and well-being
(how much of the technology you enjoy could you create
on your own?), and no one individual can be said to be in
charge.
This, in turn, has instilled in us a probably unique group
psychology that includes the other-regarding traits Gintis
et al. describe, notably, a sense of fairness and justice in our
dealings with others and with our group. But these exist, I
suggest, not because we are innately fair or just but as val-
uable brakes on our tendencies to act selﬁshly (because to do
so risks being expelled from the group or even killed) and
to avoid being taken advantage of by others.
In a word, this psychology exists to make the group work
because individuals are better off with it than without it.
Thus, think of emotions, such as those associated with fair-
ness and justice, as motivational states that natural selection
has built into us. They are vivid, salient, and never far from
our awareness. But they are not simple and robotic in their
application. We have an alarming ability to suspend or even
disregard the morality that we normally extend to members
of our own tribe when we confront members of other tribes
or even discover traitors in our own ranks; our so-called
morality, ironically, has probably led to some of the greatest
slaughters of modern times.
So, the picture that emerges of our species is a complicated
one. Yes, we have a sense of what Gintis et al. call “other-
ness,” but this probably should not be confused with being
an innately angelic and kind species. More likely is that we
are a shrewd and calculating species, such that our hyper-
social brains and their sophisticated cognition enable us to
adjust our behavior to circumstances—kind and generous
when circumstances call for it, self-regarding and even brutal
when we can get away with it. The countering observation—
that we sometimes behave in other-regarding ways, even
when not being observed or immediately rewarded—is sim-
ply a measure of how strong our emotions, as motivational
states, are in getting us to behave in ways that will generally
reward us.
Gintis et al. are aware of this difﬁcult and calculating na-
ture of our species. They paint a picture of egalitarian social-
political groupings in our hunter-gatherer past, shored up by
gene-culture coevolution that built these proclivities into us. But
they recognize that these allegedly egalitarian tendencies were
abandoned as soon as stored wealth became available with the
advent of farming and inequalities could emerge. So, it seems
that the hardwiring from gene-culture coevolution easily came
unraveled or perhaps was never there in quite the wiring
diagram they suggest (to be fair to Gintis et al., it is never
clear to me just what they do think has been wired into us by
gene-culture coevolution).
What does seem clear, though, is that sometime in our
past (my hunch is that it coincides roughly with the advent
of our species around 160,000–200,000 years ago; Pagel 2012)
we (somehow) acquired the cognitive skills that enabled a
ﬂuidity in our social relations, and it is this shrewdness—
be cooperative and other regarding when needed, be self-
regarding when that works—that really characterizes the
hardwired political dimension of our cognition.
Jill D. Pruetz
Department of Anthropology, Iowa State University, 324 Curtiss
Hall, Ames, Iowa 50011, U.S.A. (pruetz@iastate.edu). 7 XI 14
Uniquely Human?
The authors outline the evolutionary origins of a sociopoliti-
cal human niche that is largely dependent on material cul-
ture, events such as control of ﬁre and cooking and the
consequences of these developments (biological as well as
cultural). They use a phylogenetic perspective to anchor their
premise, so that their hypothesis is based on the available
data on nonhuman primate behavior. However, detractors
may ﬁnd their scenario—which includes, in addition to those
traits listed above, active sharing, cooperative hunting and
breeding, lethal weapons and bipedal running—as another
“just so” story in paleoanthropology. Beginning with the sec-
tion on the control of ﬁre, their premise becomes more spec-
ulative and rests on multiple levels of inference. Regardless, I
ﬁnd it provocative, and I anticipate it will lead to further re-
ﬁnement of the various hypotheses.
I am particularly intrigued by the authors’ inclusion and
treatment of lethal weapons and hunting. Most of my criti-
cisms are minor but could have important implications for
reﬁning their hypotheses. In general, their chimpanzee model
stems from research on the East African subspecies (Pan
troglodytes schweinfurthii), and I believe their hypotheses
would be strengthened by a more balanced assessment of Pan
as well as inclusion of key examples from other primates
(e.g., reversals in dominance systems; Sapolsky and Share
2004) and updated data on nonprimate species (e.g., wolves;
Smith and Ferguson 2012).
The authors’ focus on large prey ignores the potential
importance of smaller prey except during times of large-prey
scarcity. The inclusion of medium-sized and small prey surely
characterized the diet of early hominins as it does living hu-
mans that practice subsistence hunting, but it does not ﬁg-
ure into the equation in bringing about a uniquely human
hominin. However, my real issue is with their assertion that
hunting and scavenging small animals is not cost effective
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for large primates. Chimpanzees (males and females) at my
Fongoli study site in Senegal hunt as well as share the meat
of very small prey (i.e., Galago). The social implications of
such sharing indicate that large-mammal hunting was not a
prerequisite for behaviors that ultimately lead to the level of
cooperation seen in our species. This leads me to question
the hypothesis that a focus on large prey by hominins was
simply cost effective.
As the authors note, chimpanzees at my study site at
Fongoli, Senegal, use wooden tools to hunt their Galago prey
in tree cavities (Pruetz and Bertolani 2007), and these tools
could be considered weapons in the most primitive sense. I
have been able to record wounds on Galago prey inﬂicted by
such hunting tools, although this is usually difﬁcult to assess,
given the rapidity of their movement as well as the quickness
with which Fongoli chimpanzees kill them (usually with a
bite to the head, which is then ingested ﬁrst). In a nonhunt-
ing context, the savanna chimpanzees I study, like apes else-
where, are quite capable of accurate, overhanded throwing
of projectiles (albeit from short distances and in a nonlethal
context), and, while rare, stone projectiles can be used effec-
tively against other individuals, including higher-ranking apes
(and in conﬂicts with baboons and spotted hyenas). Similar
to chimpanzees at Tai Forest, Ivory Coast (Boesch 2009),
Fongoli apes have been observed to use weapons to attack
leopards (Jill D. Pruetz and Kelly M. Boyer, unpublished
manuscript). In our case, an older female with a ventral
infant and an older male led the attack on a leopard hiding
in a cave while the rest of the large social party looked on.
These individuals were able to ultimately chase the leopard
from its hiding place. Such observations make me question
the point that powerful weapons would be needed to kill a
predator when in fact driving them away would appear to be
just as cost effective. There are a number of similar points
that I found contradictory in the scenario, but reconstructing
the hominin niche is understandably a complex process.
In general, I assert that most of the traits considered to be
uniquely human, in fact, are likely shared with other primate
species. Besides linguistic abilities of persuasion, almost ev-
ery trait described could be rooted phylogenetically in our
order. I appreciate the authors’ assertion that, in order to
better understand aspects of human evolution, anthropolo-
gists must recognize shared as well as uniquely derived traits.
This necessary part of the process of phylogenetic analysis
is often neglected, especially in recent years following the
criticism of the chimpanzee model. However, without such a
step, understanding human behavioral uniqueness becomes
a guessing game and almost purely speculative. Throughout
the paper, I would make additional speciﬁc criticisms re-
garding the authors’ need to more accurately anchor their
phylogenetic reconstruction of behavior using data from ex-
tant nonhuman primate species, but I applaud their efforts
and anticipate that proponents and detractors alike will re-
ﬁne it.
Penny Spikins
Department of Archaeology, University of York, King’s Manor,
York YO1 7EP, United Kingdom (penny.spikins@york.ac.uk).
12 XI 14
Gintis, van Shaik, and Boehm marshal an array of different
lines of evidence to put forward a convincing case for the
role of political life in the emergence of distinctive human
social systems. In particular, they argue that the creation of
potentially lethal weapons played a key role in the evolution
of human egalitarian social/political systems, suppressing the
potential for physical dominance and promoting prosocial
tendencies. In their view, the origins of such systems lie in
social changes occurring more than a million years ago, per-
haps as far as 3 or 4 million years in the past, with their con-
tinuing inﬂuence being felt today.
Their argument ﬁts with growing tendencies to trace hu-
man social systems much further back than the origins of
our own species. Moreover, their perspectives align with a
growing awareness that the social elements of human sys-
tems may have been much more signiﬁcant in human suc-
cess than the technological and that early humans may have
been far more other regarding than we have assumed. None-
theless, an emphasis on the development of weapons (an ex-
ternal material construction unique to humans) and the in-
ﬂuence of weapons on the emerging moral basis to human
societies is novel, adding a new element to a recent move to
such perspectives, as does their appreciation of the potential
antiquity of a variability of human social/political systems.
The evidence for early use of weapons to support this ar-
gument is a little more scanty than we might like. In partic-
ular, evidence for weapons is circumstantial until 500,000
years ago, when we see impact marks from spears on hunted
animals at sites such as Boxgrove in the United Kingdom, and
slightly later, around 400,000 years, when we see preserved
weapons themselves (wooden spears) at Shoningen in Ger-
many. Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine the appropriate
preservation or extent of wear to ever give us sufﬁcient evi-
dence for weapons before this period. Handaxes are most
clearly butchery tools unlikely to be used as killing weapons,
and ﬂakes used in ad hoc fashion are conversely unlikely to
leave wear traces from use. Moreover, the most likely weap-
ons would be wooden spears, unlikely to be preserved any
earlier in the archaeological record. With evidence for early
access to carcasses and potentially hunting from at least 1.8
million years ago (Bunn and Gurtov 2014) plus evidence that
even spheroids at sites such as Olduvai would have been used
as weapons, the antiquity of such lethal weapons seems en-
tirely supportable, and social inferences likewise.
As the authors hypothesize, social changes appear to occur
alongside economic developments not only directly through
the social impact of lethal weapons themselves but also
through a greater emphasis on hunting, with the need for
sharing of meat and the control of ﬁre for cooking. These
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economic developments set in place a social system entirely
distinct from other primates and one that fostered social
sharing norms. A suite of changes including increasing col-
laboration, alloparenting, and hominin encephalization co-
occur. While Gintis et al. are certainly not alone in linking
these many different social changes and ﬁnding their basis in
inferences about the social systems of the last common an-
cestor (Whiten and Erdal 2012), they add elements unique
to humans (the use of shaped stone tools and of ﬁre) to the
equation.
If there is an area I would have like to have seen developed
further, it is that of how, though acting on individuals, se-
lection pressures acted to produce the other focus of social
cognition so central to the political system proposed. Whereas
biological evolution illustrates many changes of tack and even
reversals, cognitive evolution seems to follow a route of in-
creasing complexity that perhaps remains to be explained.
Nowak and Sigmund (2005), for example, refer to the ratchet
effect caused by indirect reputation in placing greater selec-
tion pressure on increases in intelligence. Conversely, Nesse
(2007) stresses the role of displays of emotional commitment
to others’ interests and the possibility of runaway social selec-
tion for signals of altruism in human evolution, and I have
stressed the role of material objects (the very weapons them-
selves) in providing lasting markers of reputation (Spikins
2012, 2015).
As with any stimulating paper addressing a complex and
important issue, we are bound to ﬁnd ourselves asking more
questions. We are left wondering, for example, how the evo-
lution of social tolerance toward external groups evolved in
settings of potentially lethal violence (e.g., see Cieri et al
2014). Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, we cannot help but pon-
der in particular the relevance of innate egalitarian tenden-
cies to modern society, with its tenuous justiﬁcation for im-
positions of dominance.
Andrew Whiten and David Erdal
Centre for Social Learning and Cognitive Evolution, School of
Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St An-
drews, Fife KY16 9JP, United Kingdom/School of Management,
University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9RJ, United
Kingdom (a.whiten@st-andrews.ac.uk). 5 XI 14
The Deep Social Mind of Humans and
the Ancestral Sociocognitive Niche
In recent years, an unprecedented richness of evidential
material has become available bearing on the evolutionary
shaping of the human mind, from sources as diverse as the
archaeology of hominid fossils and artefacts, comparative
genomics, ethnographies of recent hunting-gathering peo-
ples, and the comparative method applied to nonhuman pri-
mates. This affords the prospect of unrivaled cross-disciplinary
analyses illuminating human evolution, yet the volume of
data available now exceeds the ability of any single author
or team to fully assimilate and synthesize it. Nevertheless—
and excitingly—a cluster of analyses sharing this aspiration
has been published in recent years; they usefully overlap with
Gintis et al. and with each other in scope, each incorporat-
ing perspectives and major sources of evidence lacking in the
others (Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich 2011; Pinker 2010;
Sterelny 2012; Tomasello et al. 2012; Whiten and Erdal 2012).
Read together, this corpus offer a new depth of understand-
ing in respect of the evolution of human nature.
Our contribution (Whiten and Erdal 2012) converges in
several signiﬁcant respects with the analysis of Gintis et al.
in its conclusions, notably concerning the special, coupled
features of egalitarianism and hyper-cooperation that under-
wrote the big-game hunter-gatherer niche that so signiﬁcantly
molded human evolution. However, our analysis incorpo-
rated other elements that we see as important omissions in
that of Gintis. We inferred ﬁve major pillars characterizing
human deep social mind, enmeshed in an evolutionary socio-
cognitive niche (ﬁg. 1): hyper-cooperation, egalitarianism, cu-
mulative culture, language, and mind reading (i.e., theory of
mind). Gintis et al. make no mention of the latter and only
minimal reference to language. We argue that together these
ﬁve pillars formed a powerfully synergistic, adaptive com-
plex in which positive feedbacks operated between all of them
(ﬁg. 1). Mind reading, for example (attribution of states of
mind, such as beliefs and desires), means that the minds of
a hunter-gatherer band interpenetrate and in a signiﬁcant
sense form an integrated group mind that—in concert with
the other sociocognitive pillars—allows the band to operate
as a unitary, coherent predatory organism (in the broadest
sense, including both gathering and hunting) that can more
than successfully compete with professional predators, like
the African big cats. There are similarly powerful reinforcing
links between all of the nine paired relationships that link the
ﬁve pillars we identify (ﬁg. 1), which together justify labeling
the human niche sociocognitive rather than simply cognitive
(Whiten and Erdal 2012).
We agree with Gintis et al. that the legacy of our peculiar
evolutionary past appears to be a social mind that incorporates
a distinctive mixture of egalitarian and antiegalitarian dis-
positions. Our own detailed combing of 24 hunter-gatherer
ethnographies consistently revealed egalitarian, generalized
sharing of meat across the band together with a consistent
lack of chiefs and ﬂattened hierarchical structure (Erdal and
Whiten 1996). After the hierarchies of ancestral ape societies,
the vast length of this hunter-gatherer egalitarian phase—
spanning many hundreds of thousands of years and active
until as recently as the rise of horticulture around ∼10,000
years ago—likely explains our species’ capacity for charity
and concern with fairness. History is replete with the hubris
of dominant leaders—after storable wealth enabled them to
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